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This paper addresses vertical ﬁscal externalities in a model where the
state governments provide health care and the federal government pro-
vides a sickness beneﬁt. Both levels of government tax labor income and
policy decisions aﬀect labor income as well as participation in the labor
market. The results show that the vertical externality aﬀecting the state
governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depend-
ing on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the
marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved
that the vertical ﬁscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers
of taxation to the states.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In Sweden, there is an ongoing debate concerning the high rates of absence from
work for health related reasons. The rates have risen signiﬁcantly over the last
decade and, in 2004, 5.2 percent of employee working hours were lost due to
sickness absence. At the same time 8.1 percent of the population between the
age of 16 and 64 years were on disability pension. One explanation for these
high rates is the high beneﬁt levels and the relatively loose regulations regarding
sick leave and disability pensions in Sweden. A complementary explanation is
the long waiting time for many surgical operations. For example, the waiting
time for a primary hip joint operation exceeds one and a half years in some
parts of the country.1
In Sweden, the levels of the publicly provided sickness beneﬁt and disability
pension are decided by central government. However, the county councils are
responsible for providing health care. The question that arises, on the basis of
this division of power between the two levels of government, is whether it leads
to a suboptimal allocation of resources. In this paper an economic federation
model is presented, where the state governments provide health care, the fed-
eral government provides a sickness beneﬁt and both levels tax labor income.2
The model resembles the situation in countries such as Finland and Sweden.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to analyze the ﬁscal externalities
facing the state governments and to characterize the diﬀerences in health care
expenditure and level of the sickness beneﬁt between the centralized and the de-
centralized solutions. Second, to analyze the diﬀerent ways in which the second
best solution can be obtained by changing the governments’ responsibilities or
policy instruments. In order to focus on vertical externalities, this paper ignores
the horizontal ones.
The paper primary relates to the literature concerning vertical ﬁscal exter-
nalities but also to the literature relating to absence from work. Brown and
Sessions (1996) provide a survey of the literature in the latter ﬁeld. Most of
the literature in this area is empirical and includes estimations of the eﬀects
1The data are obtained from Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se), The Swedish Social Insurance
Agency (www.forsakringskassan.se) and The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and
Regions (sas.lf.se).
2In this paper "federal government" is used to denote the central government and "state
government" is used to denote the lower level of government, like state, regional or local level
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of working conditions, stipulated work time, job satisfaction and overtime, on
work absence. Also, the literature provides strong support for the idea that
economic incentives impact upon absence behavior.
Vertical ﬁscal externalities when federal and state governments impose taxes
on the same tax base were ﬁrst considered by Hansson and Stuart (1987), Flow-
ers (1988) and Johnson (1988). Flowers showed that a federation of Leviathan
revenue maximizing governments will end up on the downward sloping section of
the Laﬀer curve. Johnson showed that residents of a state prefer to redistribute
using state taxes as opposed to federal taxes since this, by reducing the money
income in the state, reduces the state’s federal tax bill, meaning that some of
the cost of the redistribution will be born by residents of other states. To deal
with the vertical ﬁscal externality Hansson and Stuart (1987), Boadway and
Keen (1996) and Boadway et al. (1998) proposed that the power of taxation be
assigned to only one level of government. Aronsson and Wikström (2001, 2003)
showed that intergovernmental transfer schemes can, in certain situations, in-
duce the correct incentives, making it unnecessary to restrict the taxation power
to one level of government.3
The majority of the literature in this ﬁeld focuses on the externality that
arises from the co-occupancy of a common tax base, as opposed to expenditure
externalities, and has come to the conclusion that the vertical externality is
negative.4 An interesting exception is Dahlby and Wilson (2003). In their
model a state government provides a productivity-enhancing public input and
both levels of government tax wages and corporate proﬁts. They show that the
vertical externality can be either positive or negative depending on the wage
elasticity of the labor demand. In this paper, a diﬀerent kind of expenditure
externality is examined. Instead of providing a productivity-enhancing public
input, the states in this paper provide a private good, health care, which aﬀects
the fraction of the population that is able to work. The state’s decisions not only
aﬀect the federal government’s tax revenues but also aﬀect its sickness beneﬁt
expenditure. The results show that the states will have an incentive to either
under-provide or over-provide health care depending on, among other things,
the wage elasticity of the labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure
on health care at the equilibrium. The federal government can induce the states
3Keen (1998) reviewed the literature on vertical ﬁscal externalities.
4Tax and expenditure externalities are here deﬁned as the eﬀects of a government tax and
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to increase (reduce) their expenditure on health care, by reducing (increasing)
the sickness beneﬁt and the federal tax rate. Whether health care will be under-
or over-provided in the decentralized solution depends on the sign of the ﬁscal
externality facing the states, the social costs of ﬁnancing the sickness beneﬁt
and on the slope of the states’ reaction functions. The federal government is
able to achieve the second best solution if it is given the possibility of deciding
an intergovernmental transfer.
In comparison to earlier studies, this paper contributes to the literature
by letting the state governments provide a good that aﬀects the share of the
population that works and hence the federal government’s transfers to those not
working. The results can be generalized to state ﬁnanced programs which reduce
the number of recipients of federal transfers, for example labor market programs,
economic development ventures aimed at reducing poverty and programs aimed
at reducing the abuse of federal transfers. Another contribution is that this
paper shows that vertical externalities will not vanish by assigning all powers
of taxation to the state governments if federal expenditure depends directly on
the decisions taken by the states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the model is set
up and the decision rules for a unitary central government, which will serve as
a benchmark in the following, are derived. Section 3 presents the decentralized
solution. First, in subsection 3.1 the policy decisions that the state governments
will take if they act as Nash competitors to one another and towards the federal
government are examined and compared with the policy decisions of the unitary
central government. Here the states’ reactions to changes in the federal gov-
ernments’ policy variables are also derived. The following subsection describes
the policy decisions taken by the federal government, when it acts as a ﬁrst
mover. Diﬀerent ways of implementing the second best solution are discussed
in subsection 3.3. Finally, in section 4 the paper’s conclusions are presented.
2 The model
The federation consists of N identical states, which are small relative to the
federation. Each state is populated by a continuum of residents normalized
to unity. The federal government pays a sickness beneﬁt to individuals on
sick leave and the state governments are responsible for providing health care.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 4
Following Boadway and Keen (1996), both levels of government are assumed to
ﬁnance their expenditure via a proportional labor income tax and to balance
their budgets. Residents are assumed to be immobile between states and beneﬁt
spillovers from health care are assumed not to exist. These assumptions allow
us to focus on the vertical ﬁscal externalities and ignore possible horizontal
externalities. Since the states are identical, no index for states is used and the
analysis is focused on a representative state, and due to the lack of horizontal
externalities N is normalized to one.
The utility function of an individual is written, Ui = u(c,l,h)−g(mi),w h e r e
i ∈ [0,1], c is private consumption, l labor supply and h health state. Preferences
are identical and the utility is increasing in c,d e c r e a s i n gi nl and strictly concave
in c and l. Individuals have no access to capital markets, so they consume all
of their income. There are two health states; healthy, hh,a n ds i c k ,hs,w h e r e
the ﬁrst yields higher utility for given levels of c and l. mi ∈ [m,m] is a moral
parameter that varies continuously among individuals and has a rectangular
distribution. −g(m) shows the non-pecuniary disutility from pretending to be
sick, when healthy. A high value of m depicts a high moral and g is assumed to
be increasing and concave in m.
By letting individuals diﬀer in respect to a moral parameter, I allow for
the possibility of a positive fraction of mimickers in the respective solutions.
The motive for doing so is primarily to add realism to the model. In reality
individuals are heterogeneous and it is, therefore, sub-optimal for a government
with limited instruments to form policies so that no one mimics another. Second,
letting the individuals be heterogeneous in this respect makes it possible to
demonstrate how the presence of mimickers aﬀects the vertical externalities.
An alternative to including moral in this form is to allow for heterogeneity with
respect to the value of consumption or leisure, or to allow for a continuum of
health states. Additive separability in g is assumed for simplicity.
The health function, equation (1) below, which is the steady state solution
to the dynamic equation5, describes the relationship between the sickness rate
5The dynamic equation is written
.
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Healthy individuals turn sick at the exogenous rate d and sick individuals recover
by themselves at the exogenous rate r.B o t hd and r take values between zero
and one. f(e) denotes the rate at which the population recovers as a result of
medical treatment.6 Health care is assumed to be exclusively ﬁnanced by the
governments and patients are assumed to experience no disutility by treatment.
f0 > 0 and f00 < 0 are assumed, stating that health care expenditure have a
positive eﬀect on the number of recoveries but that the eﬀect of expenditure is
decreasing.7
The justiﬁcation for the assumption that health care is exclusively ﬁnanced
by the governments is two-fold. First, the purpose of this paper is to study the
interactions between diﬀerent levels of government when health care and sick-
ness beneﬁts are publicly provided. Second, incorporating motives for the public
provision, instead of just assuming it, would complicate the model without con-
tributing to the understanding of the problem. Among the possible motives for
the public provision of health care and sickness beneﬁt, distributional objectives
and adverse selection can be mentioned.
In the model presented here, all sick individuals will be on sick leave. Healthy
individuals can either work (workers) or be on sick leave (mimickers). Let
s(e)=a(e)+ˆ a(1−a(e)),w h e r es(e) is the absence rate8 and ˆ a is the fraction of
healthy individuals who are mimickers. Both levels of government are assumed
t ok n o wt h es i z eo ff(e) for all possible levels of e as well as the value of the
parameters r and d; a(e), s(e) and ˆ a a r ea l s oa s s u m e dt ob eo b s e r v a b l eb yt h e m .
However, the governments can not observe an individual’s morals or whether the
individual is sick or a mimicker. In reality, governments that provide sickness
6Since the population is constant, this is a way of modeling the number of treated individ-
uals as a monotone function of health care expenditure, but does not imply that that medical
treatment is applied to the whole population. An alternative would be to let f(e) denote the
rate at which the sick fraction of the population recovers as a result of medical treatment.
However, this would imply that the cost of treating a given share of the sick is independent
of the number of sick individuals, which is clearly unrealistic.
7Expenditure on health care might aﬀect the sickness rate by, for example, leading to a
reduction in waiting times or improved procedures.
8In this paper, the absence rate can be interpreted to include not only the sickness absence
rate among employees, but also the rate of individuals on disability pension.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 6
beneﬁts often attempt to distinguish mimickers from the sick by requiring a
doctor’s certiﬁcate as a prerequisite for receiving a sickness beneﬁt, at least for
long-term sick leave. However, physicians cannot distinguish perfectly between
a sick individual and a mimicker, and even if they can, the incentives to reveal a
mimicker is often limited (see e.g. Shortell (1998) for a discussion of physician’s
multiple accountabilities). The governments are, therefore, unlikely to be able
to identify all mimickers. One could model this by introducing some probability
for a mimicker to be detected and perhaps a penalty if detected. This would
reduce the problem with mimickers, but would not change the general results.
Further as introducing this factor would complicate the model, the extreme case
where governments have no possibility of detecting a mimicker is chosen.
The private agents are assumed to make their choices concerning labor sup-
ply and sick leave after the governments’ policies have been proclaimed. The
workers choose consumption and labor supply to maximize their utility, subject
to their budget constraints
c = w(1 − t − T)l,
where t and T are tax rates imposed by the state and federal governments,
respectively, and w is the exogenously given real wage rate. The outcome of a
worker’s optimization problems will be c = c(w(1−t−T)) and l = l(w(1−t−T)).
For individuals on sick leave c = B,w h e r eB is the sickness beneﬁt. The indirect
utility function for workers, and the conditional indirect utility functions for
mimickers and sick individuals, respectively, are written
V h = v(w(1 − t − T),h h),
c V h
i = e v(B,hh) − g(mi),
V s = e v(B,hs),
where tilde indicates that the indirect utilities for mimickers and sick individuals
are conditioned on the labor supply being ﬁxed at zero. Healthy individuals will
be on sick leave if
e v(B,hh) − g(mi) ≥ v(w(1 − t − T),h h),( 2 )
therefore ˆ a =ˆ a(t,T,B). Equation (2) tells us that for the last individual who
chooses to be a mimicker mi = g−1(x),w h e r ex = e v(B,hh) − v(w(1 − t −Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 7
T),h h). The rectangular distribution of m, together with the concavity of g(m),






= g−10(x)v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w>0
∂ˆ a
∂B







∂T2 = −g−10(x)v00(w(1 − t − T),h h)w2
+g−100(x)[v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w]2 > 0
∂2ˆ a
∂t∂B
= v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)wg−100(x)e v0(B,hh) ≥ 0
∂2ˆ a
∂B2 = g−10(x)e v00(B,hh)+g−100(x)[e v0(B,hh)]2 R 0.
Ranking individuals by increasing morals and assuming the welfare objective
to be utilitarian9, permits the governments’ objective function to be written




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di.( 3 )
2.1 Centralized policy decisions
In this section the policy decisions that a central government in a unitary nation
would take, in the absence of any ﬁscal responsibility of any lower level of gov-
ernment, are derived. These policy decisions will later be used as a benchmark
against which the decentralized policy decisions will be compared. When all
policy decisions are made by the central government there is no need to distin-
guish between the federal and state tax rates. It is therefore assumed that the
9One could allow the governments to diﬀerently weight the utility of workers, sick individ-
uals and mimickers. Perhaps the most reasonable alteration would be to assign a lower weight
to mimickers, since they abuse the system (see e.g. Sandmo (1981) for a discussion about
this). This would aﬀect the decisions taken both in the centralized and decentralized setting,
but would not contribute to the understanding of the vertical ﬁscal externalities analyzed in
this paper. Since this also would expand the notation and require more extensive explanations
of the equations to follow, this is not done. However, the main eﬀects of assigning a lower
weight to mimickers will be mentioned in the paper.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 8
government chooses a single rate τ = T +t. The decision variables are τ, B and
e. The second order conditions for maximums are assumed to be fulﬁlled and
the solution is assumed to imply positive levels for all variables. The optimiza-
tion problem of the central government in a unitary nation coincides with the
social optimization problem and can be written
Max
τ,B,e




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
subject to the budget constraint
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)τwl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B − e =0 ,
where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned as before. The Lagrangian becomes




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
+ γ{(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)τwl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B − e},
where γ is the Lagrangian multiplier, which at the optimum can be interpreted
as the marginal cost of public funds. Given that the condition in equation (2)
results in equally high utilities for a worker and for the last individual whoSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 9
chooses to be a mimicker, the ﬁrst order conditions can be written
τ : −(1 − ˆ a)v0(w(1 − τ),h h)w




B : a(e)e v0(B,hs)+( 1− a(e))ˆ ae v0(B,hh)













−γ{(1 − ˆ a)(τwl+ B)a0(e)+1 } =0 .( 6 )
Note that the expression in curly brackets in equation (4), except B ∂ˆ a
∂τ,
multiplied with (1 − a(e)) represents the slope of the so called ‘Laﬀer curve’.10
Since v0(w(1 − τ),h h) > 0, (1 − a(e)) > 0 and B ∂ˆ a
∂τ > 0, equation (4) implies
that the tax revenue is a non-decreasing function of the tax rate in the unitary
solution. Throughout this paper, l0 is assumed to be strictly positive, stating
that the substitution eﬀect always dominates the income eﬀect.
Equation (5) shows that the marginal beneﬁt of consumption, for the average
person on sick leave, will be higher than the marginal cost of public funds. The
reason for this is that the government holds back the level of the sickness beneﬁt,
since it will aﬀect the fraction that works.
The ﬁrst row of equation (6) shows the marginal beneﬁto fe x p e n d i t u r eo n
health care. Since a fraction of those who will be treated will become mimickers,
the expression consists of a weighted sum of workers’ utility and mimickers’
utility, minus the utility of sick individuals. Throughout this paper, the utility
of the average healthy individual is assumed always to exceed the utility of a
sick individual. −(1−ˆ a)(τwl+ B)a0(e) is a ‘health budget feedback eﬀect’ that
shows the extra tax revenues and public savings that expenditure on health care
will cause. Let τ∗,B∗,e ∗, denote the second best tax and expenditure policies.11
10In addition to the standard terms in the Laﬀer curve, which describes the relationship be-
tween tax revenues and the tax rate through the workers labor supply decision, the expression
includes the term τwl∂ˆ a
∂τ, which multiplied with (1−a(e)) describes how the tax revenues are
aﬀected by the tax rate through its eﬀect on the number of workers.
11If mimickers were assigned the weight ζ, 0 ≤ ζ<1, in the social welfare function, thisSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 10
3 Decentralized policy decisions
This section begins with a description of the optimization problems facing the
state and federal governments, and then diﬀerent methods of implementing
the second best resource allocation are discussed. The decisions of the federal
government are important for all states and therefore the federal government
is assumed to act as a ﬁrst mover, committing to its policies before the states
and anticipating their eﬀects on the states’ decisions. The consequences for the
federal government of the actions taken by a single small state are minor and
the states are therefore assumed to act as Nash competitors towards it. As
mentioned, no interactions between the states are assumed to exist and hence
the states take the decisions by the other states as given.
3.1 The state governments
Since all states are identical, we can focus on a representative state. The state
government chooses t and e to maximize its objective function subject to its
budget constraint. The optimization problem can be written
Max





(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)twl − e =0 ,
would result in lower levels of τ∗,B∗,e ∗ compared to the case above, when the weight is unity.
This can be seen by inserting ζ before the mimickers’ utilities and marginal utilities in the
ﬁrst order conditions and adding the terms [ζ f V h
ˆ a −V h] ∂ˆ a
∂τ and [ζ f V h
ˆ a −V h] ∂ˆ a
∂B to equations (4)
and (5), respectively. Here f V h
ˆ a denotes the utility of the marginal mimicker. Since equation
(2) gives that f V h
ˆ a = V h, these new terms will be negative and therefore work for a lower tax
rate and a lower sickness beneﬁt. The latter would also be reduced compared to the case when
ζ =1 , since part of the utility of the beneﬁt goes to mimickers. Further, the government’s
incentive to cure individuals would be reduced, since some of the cured ones would become
mimickers.
The decentralized solution is aﬀected correspondingly.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 11
where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned above. The ﬁrst order conditions can be written
t : −(1 − ˆ a)v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w













−γs{(1 − ˆ a)twla0(e)+1 } =0 ,
where γs denotes the Lagrangian multiplier, which at the optimum can be in-
terpreted as the state’s perceived marginal cost of public funds.
Comparing these conditions with those for the unitary nation, we see that
they neglect the eﬀect that the policy decisions will have on the federal budget.
The tax externality works for a too high t and e if T>0 or B>0, but the
opposite is true for expenditure externality. Which eﬀect that dominates is
inconclusive, given the assumptions made. Even if the federal tax rate is zero,
the states may have suboptimal incentives since they neglect the eﬀe c tt h a tt h e i r
decisions will have on the federal government’s expenditure for sickness beneﬁt.
To determine under which conditions the state will have an incentive to
under- and over-provide health care, an expression for the vertical ﬁscal exter-
nality has to be derived. Given that the federal government’s budget constraint,
Rf,c a nb ew r i t t e n
Rf =( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)Twl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B,( 7 )
















1+( 1− ˆ a)twla0(e)
(1 − a(e))
£




de originates from the state’s budget constraint. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e
equation describes the indirect eﬀect that the state’s health care expenditure
have on the federal budget constraint, through its relationship with the state’s
tax rate given by the state’s budget constraint. This indirect eﬀect worksSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 12
through the eﬀect of the tax rate on the workers’ labor supply and the rate
of mimickers. The last term shows how the state’s health care expenditure in-
ﬂuence the federal budget constraint by changing the share of the population
that works and therefore not only altering the federal tax income but also the
federal government expenditure on sickness beneﬁt. A positive vertical ﬁscal ex-
ternality,
dRf
de > 0, means that the state will have an incentive to under-provide
health care.
Given that the federal budget constraint can be written
(1 − s(e))Twl= s(e)B. (10)
and multiplying by de
dt gives us Proposition 1 below, where η =( ∂l/∂w)(w/l) is
the wage elasticity of the labor supply among workers and the term de
dt is the
inverse of equation (9). Given the states’ ﬁrst order conditions, de
dt is positive.
Proposition 1 In a decentralized setting where the state governments act as
Nash competitors and given any level of the federal government’s tax rate and
the sickness beneﬁt, the states will under-provide (over-provide) health care if
s(e)η +
1










The proposition shows that health care will be under-provided by the states
for any given level of B and T if the tax externality (the left hand side of equation
(11)) is dominated by the expenditure externality (the right hand side). That
is, health care will be under-provided if an increase in the states’ tax rates will
have a smaller impact on the federal government’s budget constraint than the
expenditure on health care that the tax increase can ﬁnance.
Proposition 1 shows that the less sensitive healthy individuals’ total labor
supply is to taxes, the more likely health care is to be under-provided by the
state government. The workers’ labor supply elasticity will be more important
the higher the fraction of individuals on sick leave. This may seem counter-
intuitive at ﬁrst, but is explained by the form of the federal governments’ budget
constraint. Equation (10) shows that a high value of s(e) implies that federal tax
revenues from a worker have to be large in comparison to the level of the sickness
beneﬁt. Therefore, changes in the labor supply will cause relatively large eﬀects
on the federal tax revenues. Other things being equal, health care is less likely
to be under-provided the higher the share of mimickers. The intuition is that ifSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 13
a large share of the healthy individuals is represented by mimickers, the ﬁscal
reason for treating the sick becomes less important, reducing the expenditure
externality.12
Equation (11) can be rewritten using the state government’s decision rule.
Maximizing the state’s objective function with respect to e, and letting t be















This allows equation (11) to be written as
s(e)η +
1
(1 − ˆ a)
∂ˆ a
∂t
< (>)(1 − ˆ a)
v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w






The denominator of the right hand side of equation (13) shows the indirect
utilities for individuals in diﬀerent states. If the redistribution in the society is
extensive, the utility of sick individuals will approach the utility of the average
healthy individual. In this case, health care will be under-provided, since the
expression on the right hand side of equation (13) will approach inﬁnity. The
intuition is straight forward. If the average individual only experiences a very
little increase in utility by getting treated, there is little incentive for the state
to provide health care.
Before we continue to the federal level, it is helpful to analyze how the state
government will react to the federal government’s decisions. Below, I describe
how the state will alter its expenditure on health care in response to changes of
T and B, respectively, and letting the state’s tax rate be deﬁned subsequently
by its budget constraint. In order to do so, equation (12) is diﬀerentiated
with respect to e and T or B, holding the other federal governments’ policy




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v00w2 dt
de
+(1 − a(e))v0w dt
de
∂ˆ a





12Proposition 1 holds even if the social weights assigned to the utilities of mimickers and











+(1 − a(e))v0w dt
de
∂ˆ a





where δ is the second derivative of the state’s optimization problem with respect
to e.
As will be demonstrated, both the numerators and the denominators of
equations (14) and (15) are negative, meaning that the state will react to an
increased federal tax rate or sickness beneﬁt by reducing its expenditure on
health care.
The denominators, δ, are negative given that the state’s objective function
is concave in e.
The ﬁrst term in the numerator of equation (14) shows that an increased
federal tax rate will reduce the workers’ utility, reducing the state’s incentive to
cure sick individuals. The other terms demonstrate how the state’s perception
of the marginal costs of public funds is aﬀected by the federal tax rate. An
increased federal tax rate increases the workers’ marginal beneﬁt of income and
reduces the amount of health care that can be ﬁnanced by a given tax rate, since
it reduces the total number of hours worked. Both these eﬀects tend to increase
the state’s perception of the marginal costs of public funds when the federal tax
rate is increased. However, a higher federal tax rate also reduces the number of
workers that are aﬀected by the tax rate, by increasing the share of mimickers.
This eﬀe c tg o e si nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o nt ot h eo t h e rt w o .I nt h ea p p e n d i xi t
is demonstrated that this eﬀect is dominated by the eﬀect that works through
changing the relation between t and e.
The ﬁrst term in the numerator of equation (15) shows that an increased
sickness beneﬁt will increase the utility of people on sick leave. This will reduce
the state’s incentive to cure sick individuals, if
∂h v(B,hs)
∂B > ˆ a
∂h v(B,hh)
∂B . This will
be the case unless consumption and health are suﬃciently strong complements,
and the number of mimickers is suﬃciently large. This is extremely unlikely
and the ﬁrst term will therefore be assumed to be negative.13 The other two
13Empirical estimates reported in the literature indicate that consumption and health are
complements, but not strong enough to make the ﬁrst term in equation (15) positive. Viscusi
and Evans (1990) estimate the marginal utility of consumption when ill to be 77.3 per cent of
that when well. The corresponding estimates reported in Gilleskie (1998) for acute illness are
58.2 and 15.6, depending on the type of illness. Since the rate of mimickers is indeed below
these ﬁgures, these estimates support the assumption that the ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 )i sSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 15
terms illustrate how the state’s perception of the marginal costs of public funds
is aﬀected by the sickness beneﬁt. As demonstrated in the appendix these terms
will be jointly negative.
To conclude, given the assumptions made, an increase in the federal tax
rate or the sickness beneﬁt reduces the state’s incentive to cure sick individuals
and increases its perception of the marginal costs of public funds, causing it to
reduce its expenditure on health care. Due to the balanced budget constraint,
this might imply a reduction of the state’s tax rate. However, a reduction of the
expenditure on health care does not by itself guarantee that the state’s tax rate
will also be reduced, since a change in anyone of the federal government’s policy
variables alters the relationship between the state’s policy variables. How the
state will adjust its tax rate, when the federal government changes its policy
choices, can be derived and interpreted in the same manner as for the state’s
adjustment of its expenditure on health care. In the appendix it is demonstrated
that dt
dT < 0 and dt
dB < 0.
3.2 The federal government
The federal government acts as a ﬁrst mover and chooses T and B to maximize
its objective function subject to its budget constraint, the private agents’ re-








[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
s.t.
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)Twl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B =0 ,
where e = e(B,T), t = t(e(B,T),B,T) and where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned
as before. Letting γf denote the Lagrangian multiplier, which at the optimum
can be interpreted as the federal government’s perceived marginal cost of public
negative.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 16
funds, the federal government’s ﬁrst order conditions can be written
T : −(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0(w(1 − t − T),h h)w
+γf(1 − a(e))
∙





B : a(e)e v0(B,hs)+( 1− a(e))ˆ ae v0(B,hh)
−γf
½




+ δB =0 ,
where
δT =[ −(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0w
+γf(1 − a(e))
∙












δB =[ −(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0w
+γf(1 − a(e))
∙















(1 − ˆ a)(−tw2l0) − twl ∂ˆ a
∂T








(1 − ˆ a)(wl − tw2l0) − twl∂ˆ a
∂t
> 0,
Z = −(1 − a(e))
∙






−(1 − ˆ a)(Twl+ B)a0(e).
Here, δT and δB represent the indirect eﬀects of the federal government’s de-
cision variables on the Lagrangian, via the reaction function for the states’
expenditure on health care and their budget constraints. The ﬁrst two rows in
the expressions for δT and δB, respectively, describe the eﬀect that the federalSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 17
government’s decision variables have on the Lagrangian through their eﬀects on
the state’s tax bases. These terms work in favor of lower T and B, respectively,
since this will reduce the states’ tax rates for any given level of e. Z relates to
the vertical externality facing the state governments, described in equation (8).
If the states have an incentive to under-provide health care, Z will be positive,
working in favor of lower T and B,a n dv i c ev e r s a .
A special case appears when the tax and expenditure externalities described
in equation (8) compensate each other exactly. Z will then equal zero and
the ﬁrst order conditions will be identical to the ﬁrst order conditions for the
unitary nation.14 In this case the federal government has enough instruments
at its disposal to obtain the unitary nation optimum. By setting B = B∗ the
federal government will induce the state governments to set e = e∗ and the
budget constraints gives (t + T)=τ∗.
In general, the externalities facing the state governments will not cancel out
and the federal government will not be able to simultaneously achieve both B∗
and e∗,g i v e nt h a tB and T are its only two policy variables. Instead, the federal
government is left to choose a point on the state governments’ reaction functions.
The diﬀerent situations are illustrated in Figure 1, where the problem is reduced
to the state governments choosing e and the federal government choosing B,
letting t and T be deﬁned subsequently by the respective budget constraints.
Z<0 and Z>0 illustrate what the states’ reaction functions can look like
if the states have an incentive to over-provide and under-provide health care,
respectively. Z =0is an illustration of the case where the tax- and expenditure
externalities cancel out exactly. U1 and U2 (U1 <U 2) illustrate what the federal
government’s indiﬀerence curves in the B − e plane might look like given the
relationship between these variables and the tax rates.
Figure 1 illustrates a setting where the federal government will choose a point
in the North East quadrant if the states have incentives to over-provide health
care. By setting B above B∗ the federal government has induced the states to
reduce their expenditure on health care compared to point 1. However, e is still
above e∗ and the total tax rate exceeds that of the unitary solution.
14To see this, use that ∂ˆ a
∂t = ∂ˆ a
∂T , insert the expressions for dt
dT |de=0 and dt
dB|de=0, respec-
tively, in the ﬁrst order conditions and rearrange.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 18
B 
e 
Z < 0 










Given the general form of the model, we can not conclude that the solution
will be in this quadrant. If the high state tax rates, associated with high ex-
penditure on health care, result in suﬃciently high social cost for ﬁnancing the
sickness beneﬁt and if the slope of the states’ reaction functions is suﬃciently
ﬂat, the federal government will choose a point in the North West quadrant. In
t h eo p p o s i t ec a s et h ef e d e r a lg o v e r n m e n tw i l lc h o o s eap o i n ti nt h eS o u t hE a s t
quadrant, which means that, by selecting a high enough sickness beneﬁt, it will
induce the states to choose e below e∗, despite their incentives to choose a too
high level of e for any given level of B.
If the states have incentives to under-provide health care, the federal govern-
ment might choose a point in the South West quadrant, as illustrated in Figure
1. This case illustrates a situation where the federal government has induced
the states to increase their expenditure on health care, compared to point 2,
by reducing the sickness beneﬁt. If the low state tax rates, associated with low
expenditure on health care, result in suﬃciently low social cost for ﬁnancing theSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 19
sickness beneﬁt and the slope of the states’ reaction functions is suﬃciently ﬂat,
the federal government will choose a point in the South East quadrant. Low
state tax rates could reduce the social cost of ﬁnancing the sickness beneﬁtb y
reducing the share of mimickers and the workers’ marginal beneﬁto fi n c o m e ,
and by increasing the number of hours each worker supplies. However, low ex-
penditure on health care implies a high share of the population being absent
from work due to illness, which increases the social cost of ﬁnancing the sickness
beneﬁt. If this eﬀect is strong enough and the slope of the states’ reaction func-
tions is steep enough, the federal government might end up choosing a point
in the North West quadrant, which means that e will be above e∗,d e s p i t et h e
states having incentives to under-provide health care for any given level of B.
To conclude, given the general form of the model we can not determine how
the level of health care provided in the decentralized setting will be in relation to
the second best level, except when the externalities facing the state governments
cancel out exactly. Whether health care will be under- or over-provided in the
other situations depends not only on the sign of the ﬁscal externality facing the
states, but also on the social costs of ﬁnancing the sickness beneﬁt, which aﬀects
the form of the federal government’s indiﬀerence curves, and on the slope of the
states’ reaction functions.
3.3 Implementing the second best solution
This section examines diﬀerent ways that the unitary nation optimum can be
achieved by changing the governments’ responsibilities or policy instruments.
A self-evident solution is to abolish the federal structure, either by transferring
the responsibility of providing health care to the federal level or by transferring
the responsibility of providing the sickness beneﬁt to the state level. In this
model these two solutions will be equally eﬀective, but in reality both solutions
might be unfeasible for constitutional, political or other reasons not accounted
for in the model.
It is also possible to implement the second best solution while retaining the
federal structure. If the federal government is given the possibility of deciding
a positive or negative intergovernmental transfer, R, the state and the federal
governments’ budget constraints become
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)twl − e + R =0 (16)Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 20
and
(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)Twl− (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B − R =0 ,
respectively. The federal government now has three policy instruments at its
disposal, T, B and R. It can observe the true marginal cost of public funds
and the preference of the individuals and is therefore able to set B = B∗.T h e
federal government is also able to observe the optimal value of τ and to design
the intergovernmental transfer so that the state governments will internalize the
eﬀects that their decisions have on the federal government. This is described in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If the federal government remits all its tax revenues back to the
states, but makes each state transfer back an amount equal to the expenditure on
the optimal sickness beneﬁt in that state, then t = τ∗ − T and e = e∗ will solve
the state governments’ optimization problem. The intergovernmental transfer
can be written as
R =( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)(Twl+ B∗) − B∗, (17)
where (1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a) is the share of workers, Twl is the federal tax income
per worker and B∗ is the optimal sickness beneﬁt.15
Proof. By substituting equation (17) into equation (16) the states optimization
problem becomes
Max





(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)twl − e +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)(Twl+ B∗) − B∗ =0 ,
where a(e), ˆ a and l are deﬁned as before. The Lagrangian is written




[e v(B,hh) − g(mi)]di
+γs{(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)(t + T)wl − (a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B∗ − e}.
15Aronsson and Wikström (2003) derived a similar result, in the context of risk-sharing in
an economic federation.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 21
Since τ = t+T by deﬁnition, this Lagrangian is identical with that for the social
optimization problem in subsection 2.1.
The fact that T can be set at any level is a result of t and T entering ad-
ditively in the individuals’ utility functions. The choice of T will not aﬀect the
policy rule, as such, but the size of the intergovernmental transfer. That is, T
is a superﬂuous policy instrument. However, if the tax rates are constrained
to be non-negative, T must be 0 ≤ T ≤ τ∗. To understand why the transfer
will make the externalities facing the states vanish, notice that equation (17) is
identical with the federal government’s budget constraint without an intergov-
ernmental transfer, equation (7), when B = B∗. Therefore, the states will take
the same decisions as they would have taken if they directly took the eﬀect of
their decisions on the federal government’s budget constraint into account.
A special case is when T =0 ,w h i c ha l l o w st h et r a n s f e rt ob ew r i t t e n
R = −(a(e)+ˆ a(1 − a(e)))B∗. (18)
The transfer will in this case be negative and equal to the expenditure on the
optimal sickness beneﬁt in each state. The size of the negative transfer depends
on each state’s decisions regarding e and t and not only has the objective to
ﬁnance the federal government’s expenditure on the sickness beneﬁt, but also
to correct the states’ incentives. This result diﬀers from that presented by
for example Boadway and Keen (1996). They claim that if all rents and tax
powers are allocated to the states, the vertical externality will vanish and the sole
objective of the transfer will be to ﬁnance the federal expenditure. The diﬀerent
result is caused here by the fact that the federal government has at its disposal
a redistributive policy instrument, B, which was not present in Boadway and
Keen (1996), and the fact that the need for redistribution is directly aﬀected by
the decisions taken by the states.
Moral hazard among individuals (captured by the parameter ˆ a)d o e sn o t
aﬀect the diﬀerent ways the second best solution can be implemented, but does
aﬀect the size of the optimal transfers. This can be seen in equations (17) and
(18).16
16Similarly, Proposition 2 holds even if mimickers’ utilities are assigned a lower social weight,
but the size of the optimal transfers would be aﬀected since this would aﬀect the values of the
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4 Discussion
This paper addresses provision of health care and redistribution, in terms of a
sickness beneﬁt, in an economic federation. The analysis is based on a model
w h e r et h es t a t eg o v e r n m e n t sp r o v i d eh e a l t hc a r ea n dt h ef e d e r a lg o v e r n m e n t
provides a sickness beneﬁt and both levels of government tax labor income.
The results show that the states can either have an incentive to under-
or over-provide health care. The federal government can induce the states to
increase (reduce) their expenditure on health care, by reducing (increasing)
the sickness beneﬁt and the federal tax rate. The results also demonstrate
that the federal government can induce the state governments to internalize
the eﬀects that their decisions will have on the federal government’s budget
constraint. This can be done by introducing an intergovernmental transfer,
where the federal government remits all its tax revenues to the states, but makes
each state transfer back an amount equal to the expenditure for the optimal
sickness beneﬁti nt h a ts t a t e .I nt h i sm o d e l ,t h ev e r t i c a lﬁscal externality will
not vanish even if all powers of taxation are assigned to the states. This result
diﬀers from previous ones presented in the literature and is caused by the fact
that the states’ decisions in this model directly aﬀect the federal government’s
expenditure.
The results from this paper can be generalized to other state ﬁnanced pro-
grams that reduce the number who receive federal transfers, for example labor
market programs, and may inform policy makers on how to reduce the misallo-
cation of resources associated with such programs.
One important assumption in the paper is that no horizontal externalities
exist. In reality, labor mobility will give rise to horizontal externalities. If labor
is mobile, expenditure on health care in a state may attract sick individuals
to that state and discourage workers, due to the higher tax rate necessary for
ﬁnancing the increased expenditure. Other states will therefore beneﬁtf r o ma
state’s increased expenditure, which implies that labor mobility gives rise to a
positive horizontal externality.17 Including these positive horizontal externali-
ties in the analysis would therefore increase the probability of health care being
under-provided in the decentralized setting, but it will not change the way the
17The possibility of patients seeking treatment in another state than that of resident, will
also cause a horizontal externality, if the state of resident does not have to fully reimburse the
state which treated the patient.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 23
federal government can inﬂuence the states’ decisions and the general result that
the unitary nation optimum can be implemented through an intergovernmental
transfer.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 24
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Appendix
Deﬁne
F =[ 1+( 1− ˆ a)twla0(e)],
G =( 1− a(e))
∙




and note, by comparing with equation (9), that F
G = dt
de.U s i n gt h e s ed e ﬁnitions,








twla0(e) − (1 − ˆ a)a0(e)tw2l0
¸










By substituting equation (19) into equation (14) and rearranging, the latter




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v00w2 dt
de
+(1 − a(e))v0w/G ∂ˆ a




+(1 − a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v0w{(1 − ˆ a)a0(e)tw2l0/G
+F(1 − a(e))
h
(1 − ˆ a)(−w2l0 + tw3l00) − twl ∂2ˆ a







The terms in the four last rows in the numerator of equation (20) describe
how the state’s perception of the marginal cost of public funds is aﬀected by
the federal tax rate, through its eﬀect on the share of workers in the population
and its eﬀect on the relationship between t and e. As will be demonstrated,
t h e s ef o u rr o w sa r ej o i n t l yn e g a t i v eg i v e nt h ea s s u m p t i o n sm a d e . G and F
are positive according to the state’s ﬁrst order condition. The quotient in the
third row is larger than one, which guarantees that the second and third rows
are jointly negative. In the ﬁfth row, the term tw2l0 ∂ˆ a
∂t is dominated by the
term −(1 − ˆ a)w2l0, since the assumption that the state’s tax revenue is strictly
increasing in its tax rate, requires that t∂ˆ a
∂t < (1−ˆ a). This guarantees also that
the fourth and ﬁfth rows are jointly negative.Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation 26
















By substituting equation (21) into equation (15) and rearranging, the latter











+(1 − a(e))v0w/G ∂ˆ a








The terms in the last three rows in the numerator of equation (22) describe how
the state’s perception of the marginal costs of public funds is aﬀected by the
sickness beneﬁt. Given the assumptions made, these terms are jointly negative
for the same reason as described above.
dt
dT and dt
dB can be derived in a similar manner. Maximizing the states’ ob-
jective functions with respect to t, letting the state’s expenditure on health care
be deﬁned subsequently by its budget constraint, gives the ﬁrst order condition.
−
⎡









−(1−a(e))(1−ˆ a)v0(w(1−t−T),h h)w =0 .
(23)




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w de
dt −
"














ζ is the diﬀerential of equation (23) with respect to t and is therefore negative,
given that the state’s objective function is concave in t.T h e ﬁrst term in the
numerator of equation (24) shows that an increased federal tax rate will reduce
the workers utility, reducing the state’s incentive to raise taxes to ﬁnance the
treatment of sick individuals. The second term demonstrates that this incentiveSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 27
is further reduced by the fact that an increased federal tax rate reduces the
total number of hours worked, reducing the amount of health care that can be
ﬁnanced by a given state tax. Further more, an increased federal tax rate will
increase the workers marginal beneﬁt of income, increasing the social cost of
raising the taxes. The fourth term shows that the social cost of raising taxes
is reduced by the fact that an increased federal tax rate reduces the number of
workers that are aﬀected by the tax rate. By substituting equation (25)
∂(de/dt)
∂T













twla0(e)+G(1 − ˆ a)tw2l0a0(e)}/F2 (25)
into equation (24) and rearranging using equation (23), it can be seen below




a0(e)(1 − ˆ a)v0w de
dt +( 1− a(e))(1 − ˆ a)v00w2
−a0(e)
"








(1 − ˆ a)(−w2l0 + tw3l00) − twl ∂2ˆ a
∂t∂T + tw2l0 ∂ˆ a
∂t
i
+G(1 − ˆ a)tw2l0a0(e)}/F2
+(1 − a(e))v0w ∂ˆ a
∂T/F
h

































The ﬁrst term in the numerator of equation (26) shows that an increased sickness
beneﬁt will increase the utility of people on sick leave. Given the assumption
stated in Section 3.1, this will reduce the state’s incentive to raise taxes to
ﬁnance health care. The second term demonstrates that this incentive is further
reduced by the fact that a higher sickness beneﬁt reduces the total number ofSickness absence and health care in an economic federation 28
hours worked, reducing the amount of health care that can be ﬁnanced by a
given state tax rate. The last term shows that the social cost of raising taxes
is reduced by the fact that an increased sickness beneﬁtr e d u c e st h en u m b e ro f
workers that are aﬀected by the tax rate. By substituting equation (27).
∂(de/dt)
∂B












into equation (26) and rearranging using equation (23), it can be seen below





















(1 − a(e))twl ∂2ˆ a
∂t∂B/F
+(1 − a(e))v0w/F ∂ˆ a
∂B
h
F +( 1− ˆ a)twla0(e) − F
(1−a(e))(1−ˆ a)(wl−tw2l0)
G
i
ζ
.